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This paper explores the determinants of corporate failure and the pricing of ﬁ-
nancially distressed stocks using US data over the period 1963 to 2003. Firms
with higher leverage, lower proﬁtability, lower market capitalization, lower past stock
returns, more volatile past stock returns, lower cash holdings, higher market-book
ratios, and lower prices per share are more likely to ﬁle for bankruptcy, be delisted,
or receive a D rating. When predicting failure at longer horizons, the most per-
sistent ﬁrm characteristics, market capitalization, the market-book ratio, and equity
volatility become relatively more signiﬁcant. Our model captures much of the time
variation in the aggregate failure rate. Since 1981, ﬁnancially distressed stocks have
delivered anomalously low returns. They have lower returns but much higher stan-
dard deviations, market betas, and loadings on value and small-cap risk factors than
stocks with a low risk of failure. These patterns hold in all size quintiles but are
particularly strong in smaller stocks. They are inconsistent with the conjecture that
t h ev a l u ea n ds i z ee ﬀects are compensation for the risk of ﬁnancial distress.1 Introduction
The concept of ﬁnancial distress is often invoked in the asset pricing literature to
explain otherwise anomalous patterns in the cross-section of stock returns. The
idea is that certain companies have an elevated risk that they will fail to meet their
ﬁnancial obligations, and investors charge a premium for bearing this risk.2
While this idea has a certain plausibility, it leaves a number of basic questions
unanswered. First, how do we measure the failure to meet ﬁnancial obligations?
Second, how do we measure the probability that a ﬁrm will fail to meet its ﬁnancial
obligations? Third, even if we have answered these questions and thereby constructed
an empirical measure of ﬁnancial distress, is it the case that the stock prices of
ﬁnancially distressed companies move together in response to a common risk factor?
Finally, what returns have ﬁnancially distressed stocks provided historically? Is there
any evidence that ﬁnancial distress risk carries a premium?
In this paper we consider two alternative ways in which a ﬁrm may fail to meet its
ﬁnancial obligations. First, we look at bankruptcy ﬁlings under either Chapter 7 or
Chapter 11 of the bankruptcy code. Second, we look at failures, deﬁned more broadly
to include bankruptcies, delistings, or D (“default”) ratings issued by a leading credit
rating agency. The broader deﬁnition of failure allows us to capture at least some
cases where ﬁrms avoid bankruptcy by negotiating with creditors out of court (Gilson,
John, and Lang 1990, Gilson 1997). It also captures ﬁrms that perform so poorly
that their stocks are delisted from the exchange, an event which sometimes precedes
bankruptcy or formal default.
To measure the probability that a ﬁrm enters either bankruptcy or failure, we
adopt a relatively atheoretical econometric approach. We estimate a dynamic panel
model using a logit speciﬁcation, following Shumway (2001), Chava and Jarrow
(2004), and others. We extend the previous literature by considering a wide range
of explanatory variables, including both accounting and equity-market variables, and
by explicitly considering how the optimal speciﬁcation varies with the horizon of the
2Chan and Chen (1991), for example, attribute the size premium to the prevalence of “marginal
ﬁrms” in small-stock portfolios, and describe marginal ﬁr m sa sf o l l o w s : “ T h e yh a v el o s tm a r k e t
value because of poor performance, they are ineﬃcient producers, and they are likely to have high
ﬁnancial leverage and cash ﬂow problems. They are marginal in the sense that their prices tend to
be more sensitive to changes in the economy, and they are less likely to survive adverse economic
conditions.” Fama and French (1996) use the term “relative distress” in a similar fashion.
1forecast. Some papers on bankruptcy concentrate on predicting the event that a
bankruptcy will occur during the next month. Over such a short horizon, it should
not be surprising that the recent return on a ﬁrm’s equity is a powerful predictor, but
this may not be very useful information if it is relevant only in the extremely short
run, just as it would not be useful to predict a heart attack by observing a person
dropping to the ﬂoor clutching his chest. We also explore time-series variation in the
number of bankruptcies, and ask how much of this variation is explained by changes
over time in the variables that predict bankruptcy at the ﬁrm level.
Our empirical work begins with monthly bankruptcy and failure indicators pro-
vided by Kamakura Risk Information Services (KRIS). The bankruptcy indicator was
used by Chava and Jarrow (2004), and covers the period from January 1963 through
December 1998. The failure indicator runs from January 1963 through December
2003. We merge these datasets with ﬁr ml e v e la c c o u n t i n gd a t af r o mC O M P U S T A T
as well as monthly and daily equity price data from CRSP. This gives us about 800
bankruptcies, 1600 failures, and predictor variables for 1.7 million ﬁrm months.
We start by estimating a basic speciﬁcation used by Shumway (2001) and similar
to that of Chava and Jarrow (2004). The model includes both equity market and
accounting data. From the equity market, we measure the excess stock return of each
company over the past month, the volatility of daily stock returns over the past three
months, and the market capitalization of each company. From accounting data, we
measure net income as a ratio to assets, and total leverage as a ratio to assets. We
obtain similar coeﬃcient estimates whether we are predicting bankruptcies through
1998, failures through 1998, or failures through 2003.
From this starting point, we make a number of contributions to the prediction of
corporate bankruptcies and failures. First, we explore some sensible modiﬁcations to
the variables listed above. Speciﬁcally, we show that scaling net income and leverage
by the market value of assets rather than the book value, and adding further lags of
stock returns and net income, can improve the explanatory power of the benchmark
regression.
Second, we explore some additional variables and ﬁnd that corporate cash hold-
i n g s ,t h em a r k e t - b o o kr a t i o ,a n daﬁrm’s price per share contribute explanatory power.
In a related exercise we construct a measure of distance to default, based on the prac-
titioner model of KMV (Crosbie and Bohn 2001) and ultimately on the structural
default model of Merton (1974). We ﬁnd that this measure adds relatively little
2explanatory power to the reduced-form variables already included in our model.3
Third, we examine what happens to our speciﬁcation as we increase the horizon
at which we are trying to predict failure. Consistent with our expectations, we
ﬁnd that our most persistent forecasting variable, market capitalization, becomes
relatively more important as we predict further into the future. Volatility and the
market-book ratio also become more important at long horizons relative to net income,
leverage, and recent equity returns.
Fourth, we study time-variation in the number of failures. We compare the
realized frequency of failure to the predicted frequency over time. Although the
model underpredicts the frequency of failure in the 1980s and overpredicts it in the
1990s, the model ﬁts the general time pattern quite well.
Finally, we use our ﬁtted probability of failure as a measure of ﬁnancial distress
and calculate the risks and average returns on portfolios of stocks sorted by this ﬁtted
probability. We ﬁnd that ﬁnancially distressed ﬁrms have high market betas and high
loadings on the HML and SMB factors proposed by Fama and French (1993, 1996) to
capture the value and size eﬀects. However they do not have high average returns,
suggesting that the equity market has not properly priced distress risk.
T h e r ei sal a r g er e l a t e dl i t e r a t u r et h a ts t u d i e st h ep r e d i c t i o no fc o r p o r a t eb a n k -
ruptcy. The literature varies in choice of variables to predict bankruptcy and the
methodology used to estimate the likelihood of bankruptcy. Altman (1968), Ohlson
(1980), and Zmijewski (1984) use accounting variables to estimate the probability of
bankruptcy in a static model. Altman’s Z-score and Ohlson’s O-score have become
popular and widely accepted measures of ﬁnancial distress. They are used, for ex-
ample, by Dichev (1998), Griﬃna n dL e m m o n( 2 0 0 2 ) ,a n dF e r g u s o na n dS h o c k l e y
(2003) to explore the risks and average returns for distressed ﬁrms.
Shumway (2001) estimates a hazard model at annual frequency and adds equity
market variables to the set of scaled accounting measures used in the earlier literature.
He points out that estimating the probability of bankruptcy in a static setting intro-
duces biases and overestimates the impact of the predictor variables. This is because
the static model does not take into account that a ﬁrm could have had unfavorable in-
dicators several periods before going into bankruptcy. Hillegeist, Cram, Keating and
3This ﬁnding is consistent with recent results of Bharath and Shumway (2004), circulated after
the ﬁrst version of this paper.
3Lunstedt (2004) summarize equity market information by calculating the probability
of bankruptcy implied by the structural Merton model. Adding this to accounting
data increases the accuracy of bankruptcy prediction within the framework of a haz-
ard model. Chava and Jarrow (2004) estimate hazard models at both annual and
monthly frequencies and ﬁnd that the accuracy of bankruptcy prediction is greater
at a monthly frequency. They also compare the eﬀects of accounting information
across industries.
Duﬃe and Wang (2003) emphasize that the probability of bankruptcy depends on
the horizon one is considering. They estimate mean-reverting time series processes
for a macroeconomic state variable–personal income growth–and a ﬁrm-speciﬁc
variable–distance to default. They combine these with a short-horizon bankruptcy
model to ﬁnd the marginal probabilities of default at diﬀerent horizons. Using
data from the US industrial machinery and instruments sector, they calculate term
structures of default probabilities. We conduct a similar exercise using a reduced-
form econometric approach; we do not model the time-series evolution of the predictor
variables but instead directly estimate longer-term default probabilities.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the con-
struction of the data set, outlier analysis and summary statistics. Section 3 discusses
our basic dynamic panel model, extensions to it, and the results from estimating
the model at one-month and longer horizons. We ﬁnd that market capitalization,
the market-book ratio, and equity volatility become relatively more signiﬁcant as the
horizon increases. This section also considers the ability of the model to ﬁtt h e
aggregate time-series of failures. Section 4 studies the return properties of equity
portfolios formed on the ﬁtted value from our bankruptcy prediction model. We ask
whether stocks with high bankruptcy probability have unusually high or low returns
relative to the predictions of standard cross-sectional asset pricing models such as the
CAPM or the three-factor Fama-French model. Section 5 concludes.
42 Data description
In order to estimate a dynamic logit model we need an indicator of ﬁnancial distress
and a set of explanatory variables. The bankruptcy indicator we use is taken from
Chava and Jarrow (2004); it includes all bankruptcy ﬁlings in the Wall Street Journal
Index, the SDC database, SEC ﬁlings and the CCH Capital Changes Reporter. The
indicator equals one in a month in which a ﬁrm ﬁled for bankruptcy under Chapter
7 or Chapter 11, and zero otherwise; in particular, the indicator is zero if the ﬁrm
disappears from the dataset for some reason other than bankruptcy such as acquisi-
tion or delisting. The data span the months from January 1963 through December
1998. We also consider a broader failure indicator, which equals one if a ﬁrm ﬁles
for bankruptcy, delists, or receives a D rating, over the period January 1963 through
December 2003.
Table 1 summarizes the properties of our bankruptcy and failure indicators. The
ﬁrst column shows the number of active ﬁr m sf o rw h i c hw eh a v ed a t ai ne a c hy e a r .
The second column shows the number of bankruptcies, and the third column the
corresponding percentage of active ﬁr m st h a tw e n tb a n k r u p ti ne a c hy e a r . T h e
fourth and ﬁfth columns repeat this information for our failure series.
It is immediately apparent that bankruptcies were extremely rare until the late
1960’s. In fact, in the three years 1967—1969 there were no bankruptcies at all
in our dataset. The bankruptcy rate increased in the early 1970’s, and then rose
dramatically during the 1980’s to a peak of 1.5% in 1986. It remained high through
the economic slowdown of the early 1990’s, but fell in the late 1990’s to levels only
slightly above those that prevailed in the 1970’s.
Some of these changes through time are probably the result of changes in the
law governing corporate bankruptcy in the 1970’s, and related ﬁnancial innovations
such as the development of below-investment-grade public debt (junk bonds) in the
1980’s and the advent of prepackaged bankruptcy ﬁlings in the early 1990’s (Tashjian,
Lease, and McConnell 1996). Changes in corporate capital structure (Bernanke and
Campbell 1988) and the riskiness of corporate activities (Campbell, Lettau, Malkiel,
and Xu 2001) are also likely to have played a role, and one purpose of our investigation
is to quantify the time-series eﬀects of these changes.
The broader failure indicator tracks the bankruptcy indicator closely until the
early 1980’s, but towards the end of the sample it begins to diverge signiﬁcantly. The
5number of failures increases dramatically after 1998, reﬂecting the ﬁnancial distress
of many young ﬁrms that were newly listed during the boom of the late 1990’s.
In order to construct explanatory variables at the individual ﬁrm level, we com-
bine quarterly accounting data from COMPUSTAT with monthly and daily equity
market data from CRSP. From COMPUSTAT we construct a standard measure of
proﬁtability: net income relative to total assets. Previous authors have measured
total assets at book value, but we ﬁnd better explanatory power when we measure
the equity component of total assets at market value by adding the book value of
liabilities to the market value of equities. We call this series NIMTA (Net Income
to Market-valued Total Assets) and the traditional series NITA (Net Income to Total
Assets). We also use COMPUSTAT to construct a measure of leverage: total lia-
bilities relative to total assets. We again ﬁnd that a market-valued version of this
series, deﬁned as total liabilities divided by the sum of market equity and book liabil-
ities, performs better than the traditional book-valued series. We call the two series
TLMTA and TLTA, respectively. To these standard measures of proﬁtability and
leverage, we add a measure of liquidity, the ratio of a company’s cash and short-term
assets to the market value of its assets (CASHMTA). We also calculate each ﬁrm’s
market-to-book ratio (MB).
In constructing these series we adjust the book value of assets to eliminate outliers,
following the procedure suggested by Cohen, Polk, and Vuolteenaho (2003). That
is, we add 10% of the diﬀerence between market and book equity to the book value
of total assets, thereby increasing book values that are extremely small, probably
mismeasured, and create outliers when used as the denominators of ﬁnancial ratios.
We also winsorize all variables at the 5th and 95th percentiles of their cross-sectional
distributions. That is, we replace any observation below the 5th percentile with the
5th percentile, and any observation above the 95th percentile with the 95th percentile.
We are careful to adjust each company’s ﬁscal year to the calendar year and lag the
accounting data by two months. This adjustment ensures that the accounting data
are available at the beginning of the month over which bankruptcy is measured. The
Appendix to this paper describes the construction of these variables in greater detail.
We add several market-based variables to these two accounting variables. We
calculate the monthly log excess return on each ﬁrm’s equity relative to the S&P 500
index (EXRET), the standard deviation of each ﬁrm’s daily stock return over the
p a s tt h r e em o n t h s( S I G M A ) ,a n dt h er e l a t i v es i z eo fe a c hﬁrm measured as the log
ratio of its market capitalization to that of the S&P 500 index (RSIZE). Finally,
6we calculate each ﬁrm’s log price per share, truncated above at $15 (PRICE). This
captures a tendency for distressed ﬁrms to trade at low prices per share, without
reverse-splitting to bring price per share back into a more normal range.
2.1 Summary statistics
Table 2 summarizes the properties of our t e nm a i ne x p l a n a t o r yv a r i a b l e s . T h eﬁrst
panel in Table 2 describes the distributions of the variables in almost 1.7 million ﬁrm-
months with complete data availability, the second panel describes a much smaller
sample of almost 800 bankruptcy months, and the third panel describes just over
1600 failure months.4
In interpreting these distributions, it is important to keep in mind that we weight
every ﬁrm-month equally. This has two important consequences. First, the distri-
butions are dominated by the behavior of relatively small companies; value-weighted
distributions look quite diﬀerent. Second, the distributions reﬂect the inﬂuence of
both cross-sectional and time-series variation. The cross-sectional averages of several
variables, in particular NIMTA, TLMTA, and SIGMA, have experienced signiﬁcant
trends since 1963: SIGMA and TLMTA have trended up, while NIMTA has trended
down. The downward trend in NIMTA is not just a consequence of the buoyant
stock market of the 1990’s, because book-based net income, NITA, displays a similar
trend. The inﬂuence of these trends is magniﬁe db yt h eg r o w t hi nt h en u m b e ro f
companies and the availability of quarterly accounting data over time, which means
that recent years have greater inﬂuence on the distribution than earlier years. In
particular, there is a scarcity of quarterly Compustat data before the early 1970’s so
y e a r sb e f o r e1 9 7 3h a v ev e r yl i t t l ei n ﬂuence on our empirical results.
These facts help to explain several features of Table 2. The mean level of NIMTA,
for example, is almost exactly zero (in fact, very slightly negative). This is lower
than the median level of NIMTA, which is positive at 0.6% per quarter or 2.4% at an
annual rate, because the distribution of proﬁtability is negatively skewed. The gap
between mean and median is even larger for NITA. All these measures of proﬁtability
are strikingly low, reﬂecting the prevalence of small, unproﬁtable listed companies in
recent years. Value-weighted mean proﬁtability is considerably higher. In addition,
4For a ﬁrm-month to be included in Table 2, we must observe leverage, proﬁtability, excess return,
and market capitalization. We do not require a valid measure of volatility, and replace SIGMA
with its cross-sectional mean when this variable is missing.
7the distributions of NIMTA and NITA have large spikes just above zero, a phenom-
enon noted by Hayn (1995), suggesting that ﬁrms may be managing their earnings to
avoid reporting losses.5
The average value of EXRET is -0.011 or -1.1% per month. This extremely low
number reﬂects both the underperformance of small stocks during the later part of
our sample period (the value-weighted mean is almost exactly zero), and the fact that
we are reporting a geometric average excess return rather than an arithmetic average.
The diﬀerence is substantial because individual stock returns are extremely volatile.
T h ea v e r a g ev a l u eo ft h ea n n u a l i z e dﬁrm-level volatility SIGMA is 56%, again re-
ﬂecting the strong inﬂuence of small ﬁrms and recent years in which idiosyncratic
volatility has been high (Campbell, Lettau, Malkiel, and Xu 2001).
A comparison of the top and the second panel of Table 2 reveals that bankrupt
ﬁrms have intuitive diﬀerences from the rest of the sample. In months immediately
preceding a bankruptcy ﬁling, ﬁr m st y p i c a l l ym a k el o s s e s( t h em e a nl o s si s4 . 0 %
quarterly or 16% of market value of assets at an annual rate, and the median loss is
4.7% quarterly or almost 19% at an annual rate); the value of their debts is extremely
high relative to their assets (average leverage is almost 80%, and median leverage
exceeds 87%); they have experienced extremely negative returns over the past month
(the mean is -11.5% over a month, while the median is -17% over a month); and
their volatility is extraordinarily high (the mean annualized volatility is 106% and
the median is 126%). Bankrupt ﬁrms also tend to be relatively small (about 7 times
smaller than other ﬁrms on average, and 10 times smaller at the median), and they
have only about half as much cash and short-term investments, in relation to the
market value of assets, as non-bankrupt ﬁrms.
The market-book ratio of bankrupt ﬁrms has a similar mean but a much higher
standard deviation than the market-book ratio of other ﬁrms. It appears that some
ﬁrms go bankrupt after realized losses have driven down their book values relative
to market values, while others go bankrupt after bad news about future prospects
has driven down their market values relative to book values. Thus bankruptcy is
associated with a wide spread in the market-book ratio.
Finally, ﬁrms that go bankrupt typically have low prices per share. The mean
5There is a debate in the accounting literature about the interpretation of this spike. Burgstahler
and Dichev (1997) argue that it reﬂects earnings management, but Dechow, Richardson, and Tuna
(2003) point out that discretionary accruals are not associated with the spike in the manner that
would be expected if this interpretation is correct.
8p r i c ep e rs h a r ei sj u s to v e r$ 1 . 5 0f o rab a n k r u p tﬁrm, while the median price per share
is slightly below $1.
The third panel of Table 2 reports the summary statistics for our failure sample
through December 2003. The patterns are similar to those in the second panel, but
some eﬀects are stronger for failures than for bankruptcies (losses are more extreme,
volatility is higher, price per share is lower, and market capitalization is considerably
smaller), while other eﬀects are weaker (leverage is less extreme and cash holdings
are higher).
93 A logit model of bankruptcy and failure
The summary statistics in Table 2 show that bankrupt and failed ﬁr m sh a v ean u m -
ber of unusual characteristics. However the number of bankruptcies and failures is
tiny compared to the number of ﬁrm-months in our dataset, so it is not at all clear
how useful these variables are in predicting bankruptcy. Also, these characteristics
are correlated with one another and we would like to know how to weight them op-
timally. Following Shumway (2001) and Chava and Jarrow (2004), we now estimate
the probabilities of bankruptcy and failure over the next period using a logit model.
We assume that the marginal probability of bankruptcy or failure over the next
period follows a logistic distribution and is given by
Pt−1 (Yit =1 )=
1
1+e x p( −α − βxi,t−1)
(1)
where Yit is an indicator that equals one if the ﬁrm goes bankrupt or fails in month
t,a n dxi,t−1 is a vector of explanatory variables known at the end of the previous
month. A higher level of α + βxi,t−1 implies a higher probability of bankruptcy or
failure.
Table 3 reports logit regression results for various alternative speciﬁcations. In
the ﬁrst three columns we follow Shumway (2001) and Chava and Jarrow (2004),
and estimate a model with ﬁve standard variables: NITA, TLTA, EXRET, SIGMA,
and RSIZE. This model measures assets in the conventional way, using annual book
values from COMPUSTAT. It excludes ﬁrm age, a variable which Shumway (2001)
considered but found to be insigniﬁcant in predicting bankruptcy. Column 1 esti-
mates the model for bankruptcy over the period 1963-1998, column 2 estimates it for
failure over the same period, and column 3 looks at failure over the entire 1963-2003
period.
All ﬁve of the included variables in the Shumway (2001) bankruptcy model enter
signiﬁcantly and with the expected sign. As we broaden the deﬁnition of ﬁnancial
distress to failure, and as we include more recent data, the eﬀects of market capital-
ization and volatility become stronger, while the eﬀects of losses, leverage, and recent
past returns become slightly weaker.
In columns 4, 5, and 6 we report results for an alternative model that modiﬁes the
Shumway speciﬁcation in several ways. First, we replace the traditional accounting
10ratios NITA and TLTA that use the book value of assets, with our ratios NIMTA and
TLMTA that use the market value of assets. These measures are more sensitive to
new information about ﬁrm prospects since equity values are measured using monthly
market data rather than quarterly accounting data.
Second, we add lagged information about proﬁtability and excess stock returns.
One might expect that a long history of losses or a sustained decline in stock market
value would be a better predictor of bankruptcy than one large quarterly loss or a
sudden stock price decline in a single month. Exploratory regressions with lagged
values conﬁrm that lags of NIMTA and EXRET enter signiﬁcantly, while lags of the
other variables do not. As a reasonable summary, we impose geometrically declining
weights on these lags. We construct
NIMTAAV Gt−1,t−12 =
1 − φ
3
1 − φ
12
¡
NIMTAt−1,t−3 + ... + φ
9NIMTAt−9,t−12
¢
,(2)
EXRETAVGt−1,t−12 =
1 − φ
1 − φ
12(EXRETt−1 + ... + φ
11EXRETt−12), (3)
where the coeﬃcient φ =2 −1
3, implying that the weight is halved each quarter.
When lagged excess returns or proﬁtability are missing, we replace them with their
cross-sectional means in order to avoid losing observations. The data suggest that
this parsimonious speciﬁcation captures almost all the predictability obtainable from
lagged proﬁtability and stock returns.
Third, we add the ratio of cash and short-term investments to the market value of
total assets, CASHMTA, in order to capture the liquidity position of the ﬁrm. A ﬁrm
with a high CASHMTA ratio has liquid assets available to make interest payments,
and thus may be able to postpone bankruptcy with the possibility of avoiding it
altogether if circumstances improve.
Fourth, the market to book ratio, MB, captures the relative value placed on the
ﬁrm’s equity by stockholders and by accountants. Our proﬁtability and leverage ra-
tios use market value; if book value is also relevant, then MB may enter the regression
as a correction factor, increasing the probability of bankruptcy when market value is
unusually high relative to book value.6
6Chacko, Hecht, and Hilscher (2004) discuss the measurement of credit risk when the market-to-
book ratio is inﬂuenced both by cash ﬂow expectations and discount rates.
11F i n a l l y ,w ea d dt h el o gp r i c ep e rs h a r eo ft h eﬁrm, PRICE. We expect this
variable to be relevant for low prices per share, particularly since both the NYSE
and the Nasdaq have a minimum price per share of $1 and commonly delist stocks
that fail to meet this minimum (Macey, O’Hara, and Pompilio 2004). Reverse stock
splits are sometimes used to keep stock prices away from the $1 minimum level, but
these often have negative eﬀects on returns and therefore on market capitalization,
suggesting that investors interpret reverse stock splits as a negative signal about
company prospects (Woolridge and Chambers 1983, Hwang 1995). Exploratory
analysis suggested that price per share is relevant below $15, and so we truncate
p r i c ep e rs h a r ea tt h i sl e v e lb e f o r et a k i n gt h el o g .
All the new variables in our model enter the logit regression with the expected sign
and are highly statistically signiﬁcant. After accounting for diﬀerences in the scaling
of the variables, there is little eﬀect on the coeﬃcients of the variables already included
in the Shumway model, with the important exception of market capitalization. This
variable is strongly correlated with log price per share; once price per share is included,
market capitalization enters with a weak positive coeﬃcient, probably as an ad hoc
correction to the negative eﬀect of price per share.
To get some idea of the relative impact of changes in the diﬀerent variables,
we compute the proportional impact on the failure probability of a one-standard-
deviation increase in each predictor variable for a ﬁrm that initially has sample mean
values of the predictor variables. Such an increase in proﬁtability reduces the probabil-
ity of failure by 44% of its initial value; the corresponding eﬀects are a 156% increase
for leverage, a 28% reduction for past excess return, a 64% increase for volatility,
a 17% increase for market capitalization, a 21% reduction for cash holdings, a 9%
increase for the market-book ratio, and a 56% reduction for price per share. Thus
variations in leverage, volatility, price per share, and proﬁtability are more important
for failure risk than movements in market capitalization, cash, or the market-book
ratio. These magnitudes roughly line up with the t statistics reported in Table 3.
Our proposed model delivers a noticeable improvement in explanatory power over
the Shumway model. We report McFadden’s pseudo R2 coeﬃcient for each speciﬁ-
cation, calculated as 1−L1/L0,w h e r eL1 is the log likelihood of the estimated model
and L0 is the log likelihood of a null model that includes only a constant term. The
pseudo R2 coeﬃcient increases from 0.26 to 0.30 in predicting bankruptcies or failures
over 1963—1998, and from 0.27 to 0.31 in predicting failures over 1963—2003.
123.1 Forecasting at long horizons
At the one month horizon our best speciﬁcation captures about 30% of the variation in
bankruptcy risk. We now ask what happens as we try to predict bankruptcies further
into the future. In Table 4 we estimate the conditional probability of bankruptcy
in six months, one, two and three years. We again assume a logit speciﬁcation but
allow the coeﬃcients on the variables to vary with the horizon of the prediction. In
particular we assume that the probability of bankruptcy in j months, conditional on
survival in the dataset for j − 1 months, is given by
Pt−1 (Yi,t−1+j =1| Yi,t−2+j =0 )=
1
1+e x p
¡
−αj − βjxi,t−1
¢. (4)
Note that this assumption does not imply a cumulative probability of bankruptcy
that is logit. If the probability of bankruptcy in j months did not change with the
horizon j,t h a ti si fαj = α and βj = β,a n di fﬁrms exited the dataset only through
bankruptcy, then the cumulative probability of bankruptcy over the next j periods
would be given by 1 − (exp(−α − βxi)/(1 + exp(−α − βxi))j, which no longer has
the logit form. Variation in the parameters with the horizon j,a n de x i tf r o mt h e
dataset through mergers and acquisitions, only make this problem worse. In principle
we could compute the cumulative probability of bankruptcy by estimating models for
each horizon j and integrating appropriately; or by using our one-period model and
making auxiliary assumptions about the time-series evolution of the predictor vari-
ables in the manner of Duﬃe and Wang (2003). We do not pursue these possibilities
here, concentrating instead on the conditional probabilities of default at particular
dates in the future.
As the horizon increases in Table 4, the coeﬃcients, signiﬁcance levels, and overall
ﬁt of the logit regression decline as one would expect. Even at three years, however,
almost all the variables remain statistically signiﬁcant.
Three predictor variables are particularly important at long horizons. The co-
eﬃcient and t statistic on volatility SIGMA are almost unchanged as the horizon
increases; the coeﬃcient and t statistic on the market-to-book ratio MB increase with
t h eh o r i z o n ;a n dt h ec o e ﬃcient on relative market capitalization RSIZE switches sign,
becoming increasingly signiﬁcant with the expected negative sign as the horizon in-
creases. These variables, market capitalization, market-to-book ratio, and volatility,
are persistent attributes of a ﬁrm that become increasingly important measures of
13ﬁnancial distress at long horizons. Log price per share also switches sign, presum-
ably as a result of the previously noted correlation between this variable and market
capitalization.
Leverage and past excess stock returns have coeﬃcients that decay particularly
rapidly with the horizon, suggesting that these are primarily short-term signals of
ﬁnancial distress. Proﬁtability and cash holdings are intermediate, with eﬀects that
decay more slowly.
In Table 4 the number of observations and number of failures vary with the horizon,
because increasing the horizon forces us to drop observations at both the beginning
a n de n do ft h ed a t a s e t . F a i l u r e st h a to c c u rw i t h i nt h eﬁrst j months of the sample
cannot be related to the condition of the ﬁrm j months previously, and the last j
m o n t h so ft h es a m p l ec a n n o tb eu s e dt op r e d i c tf a i l u r e st h a tm a yo c c u ra f t e rt h ee n d
of the sample. Also, many ﬁr m se x i tt h ed a t a s e tf o ro t h e rr e a s o n sb e t w e e nd a t e st−1
and t−1+j. On the other hand, as we lengthen the horizon we can include failures
that are immediately preceded by missing data. We have run the same regressions
for a subset of ﬁr m sf o rw h i c hd a t aa r ea v a i l a b l ea ta l lt h ed i ﬀerent horizons. This
allows us to compare R2 statistics directly across horizons. We obtain very similar
results to those reported in Table 4, suggesting that variation in the available data is
not responsible for our ﬁndings.
3.2 Comparison with distance to default
A leading alternative to the reduced-form econometric approach we have implemented
in this paper is the structural approach of Moody’s KMV (Crosbie and Bohn 2001),
based on the structural default model of Merton (1974). This approach uses the
Merton model to construct “distance to default”, DD, a measure of the diﬀerence
between the asset value of the ﬁrm and the face value of its debt, scaled by the
standard deviation of the ﬁrm’s asset value. Taken literally, the Merton model implies
a deterministic relationship between DD and the probability of default, but in practice
this relationship is estimated by a nonparametric regression of a bankruptcy or failure
indicator on DD. That is, the historical frequency of bankruptcy is calculated for
ﬁrms with diﬀerent levels of DD, and this historical frequency is used as an estimate
of the probability of bankruptcy going forward.
To implement the structural approach, we calculate DD in the manner of Hil-
14legeist, Keating, Cram, and Lunstedt (2004) by solving a system of two nonlinear
equations. The details of the calculation are described in the Appendix. Table 5
compares the predictive power of the structural model with that of our best reduced-
form model. The top panel reports the coeﬃcients on DD in a simple regression of
our failure indicator on DD, and in a multiple regression on DD and the variables
included in our reduced-form model. DD enters with the expected negative sign and
is highly signiﬁcant in the simple regression. In the multiple regression, however,
it enters with a perverse positive sign at a short horizon, presumably because the
reduced-form model already includes volatility and leverage, which are the two main
inputs to the calculation of DD. The coeﬃcient on DD only becomes negative and
signiﬁcant when the horizon is extended to one or three years.
T h eb o t t o mp a n e lo fT a b l e5r e p o r t st h ep s e u d oR2 statistics for these regressions.
While the structural model achieves a respectable R2 of 16% for short-term failure
prediction, our reduced-form model almost doubles this number. Adding DD to the
reduced-form model has very little eﬀect on the R2, which is to be expected given
the presence of volatility and leverage in the reduced-form model. These results hold
both when we calculate R2 in-sample, using coeﬃcients estimated over the entire
period 1963-2003, and when we calculate it out-of-sample, using coeﬃcients each
year from 1981 onwards that were estimated over the period up to but not including
that year. The two sets of R2 are very similar because most failures occur towards
the end of the dataset, when the full-sample model and the rolling model have very
similar coeﬃcients.
The structural approach is designed to forecast default at a horizon of one year.
This suggests that it might perform relatively better as we forecast failure further
into the future. It is true that DD enters our model signiﬁcantly with the correct
sign at longer horizons, but Table 5 shows that the relative performance of DD and
our econometric model is relatively constant across forecast horizons.
We conclude that the structural approach captures important aspects of the
process determining corporate failure. The predictive power of DD is quite impres-
sive given the tight restrictions on functional form imposed by the Merton model. If
one’s goal is to predict failures, however, it is clearly better to use a reduced-form
econometric approach that allows volatility and leverage to enter with free coeﬃ-
cients and that includes other relevant variables. Bharath and Shumway (2004), in
independent recent work, reach a similar conclusion.
153.3 Other time-series and cross-sectional eﬀects
As we noted in our discussion of Table 1, there is considerable variation in the failure
rate over time. We now ask how well our model ﬁts this pattern. We ﬁrst calculate
the ﬁtted probability of failure for each company in our dataset using the coeﬃcients
from our best reduced-form model. We then average over all the predicted probabil-
ities to obtain a prediction of the aggregate failure rate among companies with data
available for failure prediction.
Figure 1 shows annual averages of predicted and realized failures, expressed as
a fraction of the companies with available data.7 Our model captures much of the
broad variation in corporate failures over time, including the strong and long-lasting
increase in the 1980’s and cyclical spikes in the early 1990’s and early 2000’s. However
it somewhat overpredicts failures in 1974-5, underpredicts for much of the 1980’s, and
then overpredicts in the early 1990’s.
We have explored the possibility that there are industry eﬀects on bankruptcy and
failure risk. The Shumway (2001) and Chava-Jarrow (2004) speciﬁcation appears to
behave somewhat diﬀerently in the ﬁnance, insurance, and real estate (FIRE) sector.
That sector has a lower intercept and a more negative coeﬃcient on proﬁtability.
However there is no strong evidence of sector eﬀects in our best model, which relies
more heavily on equity market data.
We have also used market capitalization and leverage as interaction variables, to
test the hypotheses that other explanatory variables enter diﬀerently for small or
highly indebted ﬁrms than for other ﬁrms. We have found no clear evidence that
such interactions are important.
7The realized failure rate among these companies is slightly diﬀerent from the failure rate reported
in Table 1, which includes all failures and all active companies, not just those with data available
for failure prediction.
164 Risks and average returns on distressed stocks
We now turn our attention to the asset pricing implications of our failure model.
Recent work on the distress premium has tended to use either traditional risk indices
such as the Altman Z-score or Ohlson O-score (Dichev 1998, Griﬃna n dL e m m o n
2002, Ferguson and Shockley 2003) or the distance to default measure of KMV (Vas-
salou and Xing 2004, Da and Gao 2004). To the extent that our reduced-form model
more accurately measures the risk of failure at short and long horizons, we can more
accurately measure the premium that investors receive for holding distressed stocks.
Before presenting the results, we ask what results we should expect to ﬁnd. On
the one hand, if investors accurately perceive the risk of failure they may demand a
premium for bearing it. The frequency of failure shows strong variation over time, as
illustrated in Figure 1; even though much of this time-variation is explained by time-
v a r i a t i o ni no u rﬁrm-level predictive variables, it still generates common movement
in stock returns that might command a premium.
Of course, a risk can be pervasive and still be unpriced. If the standard imple-
mentation of the CAPM is exactly correct, for example, then each ﬁrm’s risk is fully
captured by its covariation with the market portfolio of equities, and distress risk is
unpriced to the extent that it is uncorrelated with that portfolio. However it seems
plausible that corporate failures may be correlated with declines in unmeasured com-
ponents of wealth such as human capital (Fama and French 1996) or debt securities
(Ferguson and Shockley 2003), in which case distress risk will carry a positive risk
premium.8 This expectation is consistent with the high failure risk of small ﬁrms that
have depressed market values, since small value stocks are well known to deliver high
average returns.
8Fama and French (1996) state the idea particularly clearly: “Why is relative distress a state
variable of special hedging concern to investors? One possible explanation is linked to human
capital, an important asset for most investors. Consider an investor with specialized human capital
tied to a growth ﬁrm (or industry or technology). A negative shock to the ﬁrm’s prospects probably
does not reduce the value of the investor’s human capital; it may just mean that employment in the
ﬁrm will grow less rapidly. In contrast, a negative shock to a distressed ﬁrm more likely implies a
negative shock to the value of human capital since employment in the ﬁrm is more likely to contract.
Thus, workers with specialized human capital in distressed ﬁrms have an incentive to avoid holding
their ﬁrms’ stocks. If variation in distress is correlated across ﬁrms, workers in distressed ﬁrms
have an incentive to avoid the stocks of all distressed ﬁrms. The result can be a state-variable risk
premium in the expected returns of distressed stocks.” (p.77).
17An alternative possibility is that investors have not understood the relation be-
tween our predictive variables and failure risk, and so have not discounted the prices
of high-risk stocks enough to oﬀset their failure probability. In this case we will
ﬁnd that failure risk appears to command a negative risk premium during our sample
period. This expectation is consistent with the high failure risk of volatile stocks,
since Ang, Hodrick, Xing, and Zhang (2005) have recently found negative average
returns for stocks with high idiosyncratic volatility.
We measure the premium for ﬁnancial distress by sorting stocks according to their
failure probabilities, estimated using the 12-month-ahead model of Table 4. Each
January from 1981 through 2003, the model is reestimated using only historically
available data to eliminate look-ahead bias. We then form ten value-weighted port-
f o l i o so fs t o c k st h a tf a l li nd i ﬀerent regions of the failure risk distribution. We
minimize turnover costs and the eﬀects of bid-ask bounce by eliminating stocks with
prices less than $1 at the portfolio construction date, and by holding the portfolios for
a year, allowing the weights to drift with returns within the year rather than rebal-
ancing monthly in response to updated failure probabilities.9 Our portfolios contain
stocks in percentiles 0—5, 5—10, 10—20, 20—40, 40—60, 60—80, 80—90, 90—95, 95—99, and
99—100 of the failure risk distribution. This portfolio construction procedure pays
greater attention to the tails of the distribution, where the distress premium is likely
to be more relevant, and particularly to the most distressed ﬁrms. We also construct
long-short portfolios that go long the 10% or 20% of stocks with the lowest failure
risk, and short the 10% or 20% of stocks with the highest failure risk.
Because we are studying the returns to distressed stocks, it is important to handle
carefully the returns to stocks that are delisted and thus disappear from the CRSP
database. In many cases CRSP reports a delisting return for the ﬁnal month of
the ﬁrm’s life; we have 6,481 such delisting returns in our sample and we use them
where they are available. Otherwise, we use the last available full-month return in
CRSP. In some cases this eﬀectively assumes that our portfolios sell distressed stocks
at the end of the month before delisting, which imparts an upward bias to the returns
on distressed-stock portfolios (Shumway 1997, Shumway and Warther 1999).10 We
assume that the proceeds from sales of delisted stocks are reinvested in each portfolio
in proportion to the weights of the remaining stocks in the portfolio. In a few cases,
9In the ﬁrst version of this paper we calculated returns on portfolios rebalanced monthly, and
obtained similar results to those reported here.
10In the ﬁrst version of this paper we did not use CRSP delisting returns. The portfolio results
were similar to those reported here.
18stocks are delisted and then re-enter the database, but we do not include these stocks
i nt h es a m p l ea f t e rt h eﬁrst delisting. We treat ﬁrms that fail as equivalent to
delisted ﬁrms, even if CRSP continues to report returns for these ﬁrms. That is, our
portfolios sell stocks of companies that fail and we use the latest available CRSP data
to calculate a ﬁnal return on such stocks.
Table 6 reports the results. Each portfolio corresponds to one column of the table.
Panel A reports average returns in excess of the market, in annualized percentage
points, with t statistics below in parentheses, and then alphas with respect to the
CAPM, the three-factor model of Fama and French (1993), and a four-factor model
proposed by Carhart (1997) that also includes a momentum factor. Panel B reports
estimated factor loadings for excess returns on the three Fama-French factors, again
with t statistics. Panel C reports some relevant characteristics for the portfolios:
the annualized standard deviation and skewness of each portfolio’s excess return, the
value-weighted mean standard deviation and skewness of the individual stock returns
in each portfolio, and value-weighted means of RSIZE, market-book, and estimated
failure probability for each portfolio. Figures 2 and 3 graphically summarize the
behavior of factor loadings and alphas.
The average excess returns reported in the ﬁrst row of Table 6 are strongly and
almost monotonically declining in failure risk. The average excess returns for the
lowest-risk 5% of stocks are positive at 3.4% per year, and the average excess returns
for the highest-risk 1% of stocks are signiﬁcantly negative at -17.0% per year. A
long-short portfolio holding the safest decile of stocks and shorting the most distressed
decile has an average return of 10.0% per year and a standard deviation of 26%, so
its Sharpe ratio is comparable to that of the aggregate stock market.
There is striking variation in factor loadings across the portfolios in Table 6. The
low-failure-risk portfolios have negative market betas for their excess returns (that
is, betas less than one for their raw returns), negative loadings on the value factor
HML, and negative loadings on the small ﬁrm factor SMB. The high-failure-risk
portfolios have positive market betas for their excess returns, positive loadings on
HML, and extremely high loadings on SMB, reﬂe c t i n gt h er o l eo fm a r k e tc a p i t a l i z a t i o n
in predicting bankruptcies at medium and long horizons.
These factor loadings imply that when we correct for risk using either the CAPM
or the Fama-French three-factor model, we worsen the anomalous poor performance
of distressed stocks rather than correcting it. A long-short portfolio that holds the
safest decile of stocks and shorts the decile with the highest failure risk has an average
19excess return of 10.0% with a t statistic of 1.9; it has a CAPM alpha of 12.4% with
a t statistic of 2.3; and it has a Fama-French three-factor alpha of 22.7% with a t
statistic of 6.1. When we use the Fama-French model to correct for risk, all portfolios
beyond the 60th percentile of the failure risk distribution have statistically signiﬁcant
negative alphas.
One of the variables that predicts failure in our model is recent past return. This
suggests that distressed stocks have negative momentum, which might explain their
low average returns. To control for this, Table 6 also reports alphas from the Carhart
(1997) four-factor model including a momentum factor. This adjustment cuts the
alpha for the long-short decile portfolio roughly in half, from 22.7% to 12.0%, but it
remains strongly statistically signiﬁcant.
Figure 4 illustrates the performance over time of the long-short portfolios that hold
the safest decile (quintile) of stocks and short the most distressed decile (quintile).
Performance is measured both by cumulative return, and by cumulative alpha or risk-
adjusted return from the Fama-French three-factor model. For comparison, we also
plot the cumulative return on the market portfolio. Raw returns to these portfolios
are concentrated in the late 1980’s and late 1990’s, with negative returns in the last
few years; however the alphas for these portfolios are much more consistent over
time.
The bottom panel of Table 6 reports characteristics of these portfolios. There is
a wide spread in failure risk across the portfolios. Stocks in the safest 5% have an
average failure probability of about 1 basis point, while stocks in the riskiest 5% have
a failure probability of 34 basis points and the 1% of riskiest stocks have a failure
probability of 80 basis points.
Stocks with a high risk of failure are highly volatile, with average standard de-
viations of almost 80% in the 5% most distressed stocks and 95% in the 1% most
distressed stocks. This volatility does not fully diversify at the portfolio level.11 The
excess return on the portfolio containing the 5% of stocks with the lowest failure risk
has an annual standard deviation of 11%, while the excess return for the portfolio
containing the 5% of stocks with the highest failure risk has a standard deviation of
26%, and the concentrated portfolio containing the 1% most distressed stocks has a
11On average there are slightly under 500 stocks for each 10% of the failure risk distribution,
so purely idiosyncratic ﬁrm-level risk should diversify well, leaving portfolio risk to be determined
primarily by common variation in distressed stock returns.
20standard deviation of almost 40%. The returns on distressed stocks are also pos-
itively skewed, both at the portfolio level and particularly at the individual stock
level.
Distressed stocks are much smaller than safe stocks. The value-weighted average
size of the 5% safest stocks, reported in the table, is over 16 times larger than the
value-weighted average size of the 5% most distressed stocks, and the equal-weighted
size is about 9 times larger. Market-book ratios are high at both extremes of the
failure risk distribution, and lower in the middle. This implies that distressed stocks
have the market-book ratios of growth stocks, but the factor loadings of value stocks,
since they load positively on the Fama-French value factor.
T h ew i d es p r e a di nﬁrm characteristics across the failure risk distribution suggests
the possibility that the apparent underperformance of distressed stocks results from
their characteristics rather than from ﬁnancial distress per se. For example, it could
be the case that extremely small stocks underperform in a manner that is not captured
by the Fama-French three-factor model. To explore this possibility, in Table 7 we
double-sort stocks, ﬁrst on size using NYSE quintile breakpoints, and then on failure
risk. In Table 8 we double-sort, ﬁrst on the book-market ratio using NYSE quintile
b r e a k p o i n t s ,a n dt h e no nf a i l u r er i s k .
Table 7 shows that distressed stocks underperform whether they are small stocks
or large stocks. The underperformance is, however, considerably stronger among
small stocks. The average return diﬀerence between the safest and most distressed
quintiles is three times larger when the stocks are in the smallest quintile as opposed
to the largest quintile. If we correct for risk using the Fama-French three-factor
model, the alpha diﬀerence between the safest and most distressed quintiles is about
50% greater in the smallest quintile than in the largest quintile. The table also shows
that in this sample period, there is only a weak size eﬀect among safe stocks, and
among distressed stocks large stocks outperform small stocks.
Table 8 shows that distressed stocks underperform whether they are growth stocks
or value stocks. The raw underperformance is more extreme and statistically signif-
icant among growth stocks, but this diﬀerence disappears when we correct for risk
using the Fama-French three-factor model. The value eﬀect is absent in the safest
stocks, similar to a result reported by Griﬃn and Lemmon (2002) using Ohlson’s O-
score to proxy for ﬁnancial distress. However this result may result from diﬀerences
in three-factor loadings, as it largely disappears when we correct for risk using the
three-factor model.
21As a ﬁnal speciﬁcation check, we have sorted stocks on our measure of distance
to default. Contrary to the ﬁndings of Vassalou and Xing (2004), this sort also
generates low returns for distressed stocks, particularly after correction for risk using
the Fama-French three-factor model.
Overall, these results are discouraging for the view that distress risk is positively
priced in the US stock market. We ﬁnd that stocks with a high risk of failure have
low average returns, despite their high loadings on small-cap and value risk factors.
225C o n c l u s i o n
This paper makes two main contributions to the literature on ﬁnancial distress. First,
we carefully implement a reduced-form econometric model to predict corporate bank-
ruptcies and failures at short and long horizons. Our best model has greater explana-
tory power than the existing state-of-the-art models estimated by Shumway (2001)
and Chava and Jarrow (2004), and includes additional variables with sensible eco-
nomic motivation. We believe that models of the sort estimated here have meaningful
empirical advantages over the bankruptcy risk scores proposed by Altman (1968) and
Ohlson (1980). While Altman’s Z-score and Ohlson’s O-score were seminal early
contributions, better measures of bankruptcy risk are available today. We have also
presented evidence that failure risk cannot be adequately summarized by a measure of
distance to default inspired by Merton’s (1974) pioneering structural model. While
our distance to default measure is not exactly the same as those used by Crosbie
and Bohn (2001) and Vassalou and Xing (2004), we believe that this result, similar to
that reported independently by Bharath and Shumway (2004), is robust to alternative
measures of distance to default.
Second, we show that stocks with a high risk of failure tend to deliver anomalously
low average returns. We sort stocks by our 12-month-ahead estimate of failure risk,
calculated from a model that uses only historically available data at each point in
time. We calculate returns and risks on portfolios sorted by failure risk over the
period 1981-2003. Distressed portfolios have low average returns, but high standard
deviations, market betas, and loadings on Fama and French’s (1993) small-cap and
value risk factors. Thus, from the perspective of any of the leading empirical asset
pricing models, these stocks have negative alphas. This result is a signiﬁcant challenge
to the conjecture that the value and size eﬀe c t sa r ep r o x i e sf o raﬁnancial distress
premium. More generally, it is a challenge to standard models of rational asset pricing
in which the structure of the economy is stable and well understood by investors.
Some previous authors have reported evidence that distressed stocks underper-
f o r mt h em a r k e t ,b u tr e s u l t sh a v ev a r i e dw i t ht h em e a s u r eo fﬁnancial distress that
is used. Our results are consistent with the ﬁndings of Dichev (1998), who uses
Altman’s Z-score and Ohlson’s O-score to measure ﬁnancial distress, and Garlappi,
Shu, and Yan (2005), who obtain default risk measures from Moody’s KMV. Vas-
salou and Xing (2004) calculate distance to default; they ﬁnd some evidence that
distressed stocks with a low distance to default have higher returns, but this evidence
23comes entirely from small value stocks. Da and Gao (2004) argue that Vassalou
and Xing’s distressed-stock returns are biased upwards by one-month reversal and
bid-ask bounce. Griﬃn and Lemmon (2002), using O-score to measure distress, ﬁnd
that distressed growth stocks have particularly low returns. Our measure of ﬁnan-
cial distress generates underperformance among distressed stocks in all quintiles of
the size and value distributions, but the underperformance is more dramatic among
small stocks.
What can explain the anomalous underperformance of distressed stocks? Perhaps
the most obvious explanation is that stock market investors underreact to negative in-
formation about company prospects. Hong, Lim, and Stein (2000) have argued that
corporate managers have incentives to withhold bad news, which therefore reaches
the market only gradually. Equity analysts can speed up the ﬂow of information,
but do so only for larger companies with better analyst coverage. To test whether
this hypothesis explains the distress anomaly, one could ask whether the underperfor-
mance of distressed stocks is more extreme for companies with low analyst coverage.
According to this view, the distress anomaly is related to the momentum eﬀect and to
the underperformance of companies with underfunded pension plans (Franzoni and
Marin 2005).
Some investors may understand the poor average returns oﬀered by distressed
stocks, but hold them anyway. von Kalckreuth (2005) argues that majority own-
ers of distressed companies can extract private beneﬁts, for example by buying the
company’s output or assets at bargain prices. The incentive to extract such ben-
eﬁts is greater when the company is unlikely to survive and generate future proﬁts
for its shareholders. Thus majority owners may hold distressed stock, rather than
selling it, because they earn a greater return than the return we measure to outside
shareholders.
Barberis and Huang (2004) model the behavior of investors whose preferences
satisfy the cumulative prospect theory of Tversky and Kahneman (1992). Such
investors have a strong desire to hold positively skewed portfolios, and may even hold
undiversiﬁed positions in positively skewed assets. Barberis and Huang argue that
this eﬀect can explain the high prices and low average returns on IPO’s, whose returns
are positively skewed. It is striking that both individual distressed stocks and our
portfolios of distressed stocks also oﬀer returns with strong positive skewness.
These hypotheses have the potential to explain why some investors hold distressed
stocks despite their low average returns, but they do not explain why other rational
24investors fail to arbitrage the distress anomaly. Some distressed stocks may be
unusually expensive or diﬃcult to short, but more important limits to arbitrage are
likely to be the reluctance of some investors to short stocks and the limited capital
that arbitrageurs have available.
Finally, the distress anomaly may result from the preferences of institutional in-
vestors, together with a shift of assets from individuals to institutions during our
sample period. Kovtunenko and Sosner (2003) have documented that institutions
prefer to hold proﬁtable stocks, and that this preference helped institutional per-
formance during the 1980’s and 1990’s because proﬁtable stocks outperformed the
market. It is possible that the strong performance of proﬁt a b l es t o c k si nt h i sp e r i o d
was endogenous, the result of increasing demand for these stocks by institutions. If
institutions more generally prefer stocks with low failure risk, and tend to sell stocks
that enter ﬁnancial distress, then a similar mechanism could drive our results. This
hypothesis implies that the underperformance of distressed stocks is a transitional
and temporary phenomenon. It can be tested by relating the performance of dis-
tressed stocks over time to the changing institutional share of equity ownership and
the characteristics of institutional portfolios.
25Appendix
In this appendix we discuss issues related to the construction of our dataset. All
variables are constructed using COMPUSTAT and CRSP data. Relative size, excess
return, and accounting ratios are deﬁned as follows:
RSIZEi,t =l o g
µ
Firm Market Equityi,t
Total S&P500 Market Valuet
¶
EXRETi,t =l o g ( 1 + Ri,t) − log(1 + RS&P500,t)
NITAi,t =
Net Incomei,t
Total Assets(adjusted)i,t
TLTA i,t =
Total Liabilitiesi,t
Total Assets(adjusted)i,t
NIMTAi,t =
Net Incomei,t
(Firm Market Equityi,t + Total Liabilitiesi,t)
TLMTAi,t =
Total Liabilitiesi,t
(Firm Market Equityi,t + Total Liabilitiesi,t)
CASHMTAi,t =
Cash and Short Term Investmentsi,t
(Firm Market Equityi,t + Total Liabilitiesi,t)
The COMPUSTAT quarterly data items used are Data44 for total assets, Data69 for
net income, and Data54 for total liabilities.
To deal with outliers in the data, we correct both NITA and TLTA using the
diﬀerence between book equity (BE) and market equity (ME) to adjust the value of
total assets:
Total Assets(adjusted)i,t = TA i,t +0 .1 ∗ (BEi,t − MEi,t)
Book equity is as deﬁned in Davis, Fama and French (2000) and outlined in detail in
Cohen, Polk and Vuolteenaho (2003). This transformation helps with the values of
total assets that are very small, probably mismeasured and lead to very large values
of NITA. After total assets are adjusted, each of the seven explanatory variables is
winsorized using a 5/95 percentile interval in order to eliminate outliers.
To measure the volatility of a ﬁrm’s stock returns, we use a proxy, centered around
zero rather than the rolling three-month mean, for daily variation of returns computed
26as an annualized three-month rolling sample standard deviation:
SIGMAi,t−1,t−3 =

252 ∗
1
N − 1
X
k∈{t−1,t−2,t−3}
r
2
i,k


1
2
To eliminate cases where few observations are available, SIGMA is coded as missing
if there are fewer than ﬁve non-zero observations over the three months used in
the rolling-window computation. In calculating summary statistics and estimating
regressions, we replace missing SIGMA observations with the cross-sectional mean of
SIGMA; this helps us avoid losing some failure observations for infrequently traded
companies. A dummy for missing SIGMA does not enter our regressions signiﬁcantly.
We use a similar procedure for missing lags of NIMTA and EXRET in constructing
the moving average variables NIMTAAVG and EXRETAVG.
In order to calculate distance to default we need to estimate asset value and asset
volatility, neither of which are directly observable. We construct measures of these
variables by solving two equations simultaneously.
First, in the Merton model equity is valued as a European call option on the value
of the ﬁrm’s assets. Then:
ME = TADDN (d1) − BDexp(−RBILLT)N (d2)
d1 =
log
¡TADD
BD
¢
+
¡
RBILL + 1
2SIGMA2
DD
¢
T
SIGMADD
√
T
d2 = d1 − SIGMADD
√
T,
where TA DD is the value of assets, SIGMADD is the volatility of assets, ME is the
value of equity, and BD is the face value of debt maturing at time T. Following
convention in the literature on the Merton model (Crosbie and Bohn 2001, Vassalou
and Xing 2004), we assume T =1 , and use short term plus one half long term book
debt to proxy for the face value of debt BD. T h i sc o n v e n t i o ni sas i m p l ew a yt ot a k e
account of the fact that long-term debt may not mature until after the horizon of the
d i s t a n c et od e f a u l tc a l c u l a t i o n . W em e a s u r et h er i s kf r e er a t eRBILL as the Treasury
bill rate.
The second equation is a relation between the volatility of equity and the volatility
of assets, often referred to as the optimal hedge equation:
SIGMA = N (d1)
TA DD
ME
SIGMADD.
27As starting values for asset value and asset volatility, we use TA DD = ME+BD,a n d
SIGMADD = SIGMA(ME/(ME+BD)).12 We iterate until we have found values
for TADD and SIGMADD that are consistent with the observed values of ME, BD,
and SIGMA.
Finally, we compute distance to default as
DD =
−log(BD/TADD)+0 .06 + RBILL − 1
2SIGMA2
DD
SIGMADD
.
The number 0.06 appears in the formula as an empirical proxy for the equity premium.
Vassalou and Xing (2004) instead estimate the average return on each stock, while
Hillegeist, Keating, Cram, and Lunstedt (2004) calculate the drift as the return on
assets during the previous year. If the estimated expected return is negative, they
replace it with the riskfree interest rate. We believe that it is better to use a common
expected return for all stocks than a noisily estimated stock-speciﬁcn u m b e r .
12If BD is missing, we use BD = median(BD/TL) ∗ TL, where the median is calculated for the
entire data set. This captures the fact that empirically, BD tends to be much smaller than TL.I f
BD =0 ,w eu s eBD = median(BD/TL) ∗ TL, where now we calculate the median only for small
but nonzero values of BD (0 <B D<0.01). If SIGMA is missing, we replace it with its cross
sectional mean. Before calculating asset value and volatility, we adjust BD so that BD/(ME+BD)
is winsorized at the 0.5% level. We also winsorize SIGMA at the 0.5% level. This signiﬁcantly
reduces instances in which the search algorithm does not converge.
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32Year Active Firms Bankruptcy (%) Failure (%)
1963 1281 0 0.00 0 0.00
1964 1357 2 0.15 2 0.15
1965 1436 2 0.14 2 0.14
1966 1513 1 0.07 1 0.07
1967 1598 0 0.00 0 0.00
1968 1723 0 0.00 0 0.00
1969 1885 0 0.00 0 0.00
1970 2067 5 0.24 5 0.24
1971 2199 4 0.18 4 0.18
1972 2650 8 0.30 8 0.30
1973 3964 6 0.15 6 0.15
1974 4002 18 0.45 18 0.45
1975 4038 5 0.12 5 0.12
1976 4101 14 0.34 14 0.34
1977 4157 12 0.29 12 0.29
1978 4183 14 0.33 15 0.36
1979 4222 14 0.33 14 0.33
1980 4342 26 0.60 26 0.60
1981 4743 23 0.48 23 0.48
1982 4995 29 0.58 29 0.58
1983 5380 50 0.93 50 0.93
1984 5801 73 1.26 74 1.28
1985 5912 76 1.29 77 1.30
1986 6208 95 1.53 95 1.53
1987 6615 54 0.82 54 0.82
1988 6686 84 1.26 85 1.27
1989 6603 74 1.12 78 1.18
1990 6515 80 1.23 82 1.26
1991 6571 70 1.07 73 1.11
1992 6914 45 0.65 50 0.72
1993 7469 36 0.48 39 0.52
1994 8067 30 0.37 33 0.41
1995 8374 43 0.51 45 0.54
1996 8782 32 0.36 34 0.39
1997 9544 44 0.46 61 0.64
1998 9844 49 0.50 150 1.52
1999 9675 . . 209 2.16
2000 9426 . . 167 1.77
2001 8817 . . 324 3.67
2002 8242 . . 221 2.68
2003 7833 . . 167 2.13
Table 1: Number of bankruptcies and failures per year
The table lists the total number of active firms (Column 1), total number of 
bankruptcies (Column 2) and failures (Column 4) for every year of our sample period. 
The number of active firms is computed by averaging over the numbers of active firms 
across all months of the year. E
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Dep variable: Bankruptcy Failure Failure Bankruptcy Failure Failure
Sample period: 1963-1998 1963-1998 1963-2003 1963-1998 1963-1998 1963-2003
NITA -14.05 -13.79 -12.782
(16.03)** (17.06)** (21.26)**
NIMTAAVG -32.518 -32.457 -29.672
(17.65)** (19.01)** (23.37)**
TLTA 5.378 4.62 3.744
(25.91)** (26.28)** (32.32)**
TLMTA 4.322 3.865 3.36
(22.82)** (23.39)** (27.80)**
EXRET -3.297 -2.903 -2.319
(12.12)** (11.81)** (13.57)**
EXRETAVG -9.51 -8.819 -7.35
(12.05)** (12.08)** (14.03)**
SIGMA 2.148 2.28 2.763 0.92 1.15 1.482
(16.40)** (18.34)** (26.63)** (6.66)** (8.79)** (13.54)**
RSIZE -0.188 -0.253 -0.374 0.246 0.169 0.082
(5.56)** (7.60)** (13.26)** (6.18)** (4.32)** (2.62)**
CASHMTA -4.888 -3.218 -2.401
(7.96)** (6.59)** (8.64)**
MB 0.099 0.095 0.054
(6.72)** (6.76)** (4.87)**
PRICE -0.882 -0.807 -0.937
(10.39)** (10.09)** (14.77)**
Constant -15.214 -15.41 -16.576 -7.648 -8.45 -9.079
(39.45)** (40.87)** (50.92)** (13.66)** (15.63)** (20.84)**
Observations 1282853 1302564 1695036 1282853 1302564 1695036
Failures 797 911 1614 797 911 1614
Pseudo R sq 0.260 0.258 0.270 0.299 0.296 0.312
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Table 3: Logit regressions on predictor variables 
This table reports results from logit regressions of the bankruptcy and failure indicator on predictor 
variables. The value of the predictor variable is known at the beginning of the month over which 
bankruptcy is measured.  Net income and total liabilities are scaled by accounting and market total 
assets. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Lag (months) 0 6 12 24 36
NIMTAAVG -29.672 -23.915 -20.264 -13.232 -14.061
(23.37)** (21.82)** (18.09)** (10.50)** (9.77)**
TLMTA 3.36 2.057 1.416 0.917 0.643
(27.80)** (22.63)** (16.23)** (9.85)** (6.25)**
EXRETAVG -7.35 -7.792 -7.129 -5.607 -2.564
(14.03)** (15.97)** (14.15)** (10.14)** (4.14)**
SIGMA 1.482 1.268 1.411 1.515 1.334
(13.54)** (14.57)** (16.49)** (16.92)** (13.54)**
RSIZE 0.082 0.047 -0.045 -0.132 -0.18
(2.62)** (2.02)* (2.09)* (6.19)** (8.03)**
CASHMTA -2.401 -2.397 -2.132 -1.37 -1.414
(8.64)** (9.77)** (8.53)** (5.09)** (4.61)**
MB 0.054 0.047 0.075 0.108 0.125
(4.87)** (4.22)** (6.33)** (7.92)** (8.17)**
PRICE -0.937 -0.468 -0.058 0.212 0.279
(14.77)** (10.36)** (1.40) (4.96)** (6.00)**
Constant -9.079 -8.069 -9.164 -10.233 -10.534
(20.84)** (25.00)** (30.89)** (34.48)** (33.53)**
Observations 1695036 1642006 1565634 1384951 1208610
Failures 1614 2008 1968 1730 1467
Pseudo R sq 0.312 0.188 0.114 0.061 0.044
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Table 4: Logit regressions on lagged variables
The table below takes our best-model variables and tests their predictive power as we lag them by 6, 12, 
24, and 36 months. The dependent variable is failure and the sample period is 1963-2003.Panel A - Coefficients
(1) (2) (3)
Lag (months) 0 12 36
DD only -0.883 -0.345 -0.165
(39.73)** (33.73)** (20.88)**
DD in best model 0.048 -0.091 -0.09
(2.62)** (7.52)** (8.09)**
Observations 1695036 1565634 1208610
Failures 1614 1968 1467
Panel B - R squared
(1) (2) (3)
In-sample (1963 - 2003)
DD only 0.159 0.066 0.026
Best model 0.312 0.114 0.044
DD in Best model 0.312 0.117 0.045
Out-of-sample (1981 - 2003)
DD only 0.156 0.064 0.025
Best model 0.310 0.108 0.039
Table 5: Distance to default and our best model
In panel A we report the coefficients on distance to default variable in a logit regression by itself and 
included in our best model. The dependent variable is failure and the sample period is 1963-2003. 
Regression results are reported for various horizons: 0, 12, and 36 months. Panel B reports the in-sample 
and out-of-sample pseudo-R squared for the regressions from panel A.Panel A - Portfolio alphas
Portfolios 0005 0510 1020 2040 4060 6080 8090 9095 9599 9900 LS1090 LS2080
Mean excess return 3.44 2.38 1.31 0.98 0.58 -0.09 -4.35 -7.87 -6.30 -16.95 10.00 6.65
(1.47) (1.08) (1.11) (1.08) (0.39) (0.04) (1.23) (1.68) (1.17) (2.05)* (1.86) (1.51)
CAPM alpha 2.80 2.05 1.45 1.55 0.54 -1.45 -6.58 -10.77 -9.22 -19.32 12.44 8.92
(1.19) (0.93) (1.22) (1.75) (0.36) (0.64) (1.92) (2.36)* (1.74) (2.33)* (2.34)* (2.06)*
3-factor alpha 5.76 5.31 2.71 0.82 -2.06 -5.70 -12.63 -17.95 -15.87 -24.89 22.72 17.37
(2.97)** (2.86)** (2.40)* (1.02) (1.66) (3.22)** (4.60)** (5.69)** (3.85)** (3.42)** (6.10)** (5.39)**
4-factor alpha 2.43 2.67 1.56 2.07 0.73 -1.14 -5.72 -9.80 -7.98 -21.07 12.01 8.14
(1.22) (1.38) (1.30) (2.50)* (0.59) (0.66) (2.13)* (3.19)** (1.90) (2.71)** (3.40)** (2.66)**
Panel B - 3-factor regression coefficients
Portfolios 0005 0510 1020 2040 4060 6080 8090 9095 9599 9900 LS1090 LS2080
RM -0.083 -0.111 -0.058 -0.028 0.104 0.334 0.480 0.477 0.443 0.249 -0.568 -0.554
(2.21)* (3.09)** (2.64)** (1.79) (4.34)** (9.78)** (9.05)** (7.83)** (5.56)** (1.77) (7.89)** (8.90)**
HML -0.474 -0.499 -0.177 0.121 0.379 0.612 0.849 0.916 0.829 0.612 -1.394 -1.182
(9.67)** (10.61)** (6.17)** (5.98)** (12.12)** (13.69)** (12.22)** (11.49)** (7.94)** (3.33)** (14.79)** (14.51)**
SMB 0.212 0.037 -0.118 -0.091 0.121 0.262 0.590 1.466 1.535 1.973 -1.394 -0.833
(3.89)** (0.70) (3.69)** (4.04)** (3.49)** (5.27)** (7.64)** (16.52)** (13.23)** (9.63)** (13.30)** (9.19)**
Panel C - Portfolio characteristics
Portfolios 0005 0510 1020 2040 4060 6080 8090 9095 9599 9900 LS1090 LS2080
Portfolio SD 0.112 0.105 0.057 0.044 0.071 0.111 0.169 0.225 0.258 0.396 0.258 0.211
Portfolio skewness 1.105 0.327 0.419 -0.265 -0.137 -0.278 1.038 1.746 2.371 1.832
Individual SD 0.361 0.351 0.305 0.289 0.308 0.371 0.511 0.685 0.793 0.949
Individual skewness 0.645 0.751 0.595 1.363 1.676 0.841 1.948 3.790 2.960 2.395
Mean RSIZE -7.786 -7.479 -7.236 -7.172 -7.371 -7.803 -8.744 -10.000 -10.584 -11.273
Mean MB 2.648 3.089 2.945 2.499 2.117 1.989 2.256 2.611 3.114 3.783
Mean Phat 0.011% 0.014% 0.018% 0.024% 0.036% 0.057% 0.11% 0.19% 0.34% 0.80%
We sorted all stocks based on the predicted 12-month probability of failure and divided them into 10 portfolios based on percentile cutoffs. For example, 0 to 5th percentile (0005) and 99th to 
100th percentile (9900). In the table below we show results from regressions of excess returns over the market on a constant, market return (RM), as well as three (RM, HML, SMB) and four 
(RM, HML, SMB, UMD) FF factor regressions. Panel A shows monthly alphas (in annualized percent units) from these regressions and the corresponding t-stat below. Panel B shows loadings 
on the three factors, as well as corresponding t-stats below, from the 3-factor regression. Panel C reports annualized standard deviation and skewness of individual and portfolio returns, mean 
relative size (RSIZE), market-to-book (MB), and probability of failure (Phat) values for each portfolio.
Table 6: Returns on distressed stock portfoliosPanel A - mean excess return
ME\Phat Low High Low - High
Large 3.94 -1.48 -0.27 0.43 0.93 3.01
(2.02)* (1.18) (0.18) (0.29) (0.41) (0.77)
4.14 0.29 2.07 0.80 1.10 3.04
(2.03)* (0.20) (1.42) (0.59) (0.43) (0.78)
4.65 2.98 -0.22 1.04 0.43 4.22
(2.01)* (1.54) (0.15) (0.65) (0.17) (1.25)
6.21 2.56 1.68 1.11 -2.40 8.62
(2.51)* (1.21) (0.80) (0.57) (0.86) (2.91)**
Small 3.77 -0.30 -3.38 -5.96 -10.62 10.87
(2.18)* (1.27) (1.20) (0.29) (1.22) (3.07)**
Large - Small -1.39 -4.63 -3.15 -0.43 6.47
(0.48) (1.47) (0.97) (0.12) (1.33)
Panel B - 3-factor alpha
ME\Phat Low High Low - High
Large 7.51 0.30 0.39 -1.58 -4.08 11.59
(4.83)** (0.27) (0.35) (1.40) (2.42)* (4.07)**
6.20 0.97 1.48 -0.58 -5.37 11.57
(3.96)** (0.78) (1.05) (0.48) (2.82)** (4.05)**
6.13 4.10 -1.15 -0.87 -5.84 11.97
(4.02)** (3.11)** (1.02) (0.69) (3.85)** (5.02)**
6.70 2.51 0.65 -0.93 -8.52 15.22
(5.06)** (2.07)* (0.58) (0.85) (5.89)** (7.07)**
Small 5.30 2.96 1.11 -3.02 -12.19 17.49
(4.36)** (2.41)* (0.93) (1.87) (4.15)** (5.81)**
Large - Small 2.21 -2.66 -0.71 1.44 8.11
(1.23) (1.63) (0.45) (0.75) (2.61)**
This table reports mean excess returns over the market and 3-factor alphas for portfolios sorted on size (ME) 
and fitted 12-month fitted probability of failure (Phat). We first sort stocks into size quintiles using NYSE 
breakpoints (following Fama-French) and then, within each quintile, sort stocks into predicted failure probability 
quintiles. All returns are in annualized percent units.
Table 7: Double sorting on size and distressPanel A - mean excess return
BM\Phat Low High Low - High
High 4.36 3.10 6.44 -1.09 -4.37 8.74
(2.41)* (1.33) (2.06)* (0.26) (0.81) (1.51)
5.69 3.88 3.26 6.71 -0.66 6.35
(2.82)** (1.90) (1.56) (2.45)* (0.16) (1.28)
2.55 2.15 2.25 1.12 -4.43 6.98
(1.57) (1.25) (1.29) (0.47) (1.30) (1.83)
2.70 -0.27 -0.42 -0.84 -3.26 5.96
(1.33) (0.23) (0.29) (0.34) (0.90) (1.23)
Low 3.77 -0.30 -3.38 -5.96 -10.62 14.39
(1.72) (0.19) (1.76) (2.29)* (2.81)** (3.01)**
High - Low 0.59 3.40 9.82 4.86 6.24
(0.18) (1.07) (2.80)** (1.16) (1.43)
Panel B - 3-factor alpha
BM\Phat Low High Low - High
High 4.02 0.39 0.58 -10.41 -15.48 19.50
(2.56)* (0.22) (0.23) (3.11)** (4.07)** (4.66)**
5.82 3.30 0.68 0.86 -9.19 15.01
(3.33)** (2.41)* (0.41) (0.43) (2.80)** (3.59)**
2.96 2.40 0.24 -3.18 -11.88 14.84
(1.91) (1.67) (0.16) (1.61) (4.33)** (4.54)**
4.53 -0.74 -2.27 -5.21 -10.46 14.99
(2.70)** (0.62) (1.61) (2.35)* (3.34)** (3.58)**
Low 7.27 1.15 -5.12 -10.39 -18.02 25.28
(4.50)** (0.80) (2.70)** (4.54)** (5.96)** (6.79)**
High - Low -3.24 -0.76 5.71 -0.02 2.54
(1.41) (0.33) (1.85) (0.01) (0.63)
Table 8: Double sorting on value and distress
This table reports mean excess returns over the market and 3-factor alphas for portfolios sorted on book-to-
market (BM) and fitted 12-month fitted probability of failure (Phat). We first sort stocks into book-to-market 
quintiles using NYSE breakpoints (following Fama-French) and then, within each quintile, sort stocks into 
predicted failure probability quintiles. All returns are in annualized percent units.F
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